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Abstract
The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores
rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This article posits that the design
of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence affects civil war
termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider central bank independence as a good signal in terms
of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the
government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, central bank independence is associated with lower
inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a
sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, central bank independence is associated with a substantial increase in the
likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) central bank independence is
associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes.
Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central
banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e. they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace
and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is
associated with lower inflation.
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Introduction
The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of
sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Regarding civil wars,
a growing literature shows that rebel group funding has
important consequences (Fearon, 2004; Koren & Bagozzi,
2017; Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed, 2017; Whitaker,
Walsh & Conrad, 2019), but we know far less about how
governments fund their civil war efforts, or the conse-
quences of different forms of financing on civil conflict
dynamics. This article focuses on monetary institutions and
explains how central banks affect the likelihood and the
form of civil war termination.
Civil wars are the most frequent form of large-scale
violence (Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009). Thus, it is
relevant to know whether domestic – in this case,
monetary – institutions have the potential to shorten these
wars. There is evidence that central banks have important
effects on international war finance, and, indirectly, on
their outcomes. However, there are reasons to believe that
the incentives affecting the relations between central banks,
governments, and third parties are different in the context
of inter- and intrastate wars. Furthermore, the characteris-
tics of civil wars allow us to test the mechanisms through
which central banks affect economic and political
outcomes.
When governments face civil wars – as in other instances
that threaten their survival – there are incentives to use any
tool to survive. In particular, governments at war might
want to control monetary institutions to print money as
desired. I argue that by restricting the government’s
access to the printing press to meet immediate needs
of war finance, central bank independence does not
hamper the ability of governments to end a civil war.
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Counterintuitively, independence of the central bank
strengthens the government in two fronts: it facilitates the
governments’ access to international financial markets,
and it limits the burden of the war on citizens through
inflation. This makes war termination, and government
victories, more likely.
This article contributes to two literatures. First, it speaks
to the literature on conflict finance. This study comple-
ments the literature on rebel group funding (Fearon, 2004;
Koren & Bagozzi, 2017; Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed,
2017; Whitaker, Walsh & Conrad, 2019), by showing that
government finance may also affect civil war outcomes.
More specifically, it explains the effect of domestic mone-
tary institutions on civil war dynamics. Although there is a
growing literature on the relationship between finance and
war (DiGiuseppe, Barry & Frank, 2012; Slantchev, 2012;
Shea, 2014; Shea & Poast, 2017), the role of central banks
during civil wars is underexplored. The few studies of
monetary institutions in war times focus on the effects of
the existence of central banks – but not on their institutional
characteristics – and in the context of interstate wars (Broz,
1998; Poast, 2015). This study builds on this literature,
and stresses that civil wars alter both the domestic incen-
tives to use monetary policy, and monetary institutions’
international credibility in ways that may differ from inter-
national wars. Furthermore, although the creation of cen-
tral banks had important consequences for war finance, the
institutional design and functions of central banks vary
significantly across countries and time. I focus on one of
the most salient characteristics of central banks, their inde-
pendence. Finally, no one has looked at how monetary
policy might affect war termination. I analyze how differ-
ences in central bank independence may affect the ability of
the government to finance the war, paving the way to
different civil war outcomes.
Second, this research also contributes to the literature
on central banking. Results show that central bank inde-
pendence produces its intended domestic and interna-
tional effects – namely, inflation control (Cukierman,
1992; Alesina & Summers, 1993; Bodea & Hicks,
2015a; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020) and access to credit
markets (Maxfield, 1997; Bodea & Hicks, 2015b) –
even in contexts in which the government’s authority
is challenged, and in the presence of strong incentives
to override this institutional arrangement.
Existing research on financing warfare
Governments can finance their warfare efforts via taxa-
tion, domestic or international borrowing, and inflation
(Seligman, 1918; Cappella Zielinski, 2016; Carter &
Palmer, 2016).1 An important literature analyzes why
governments choose different strategies to finance inter-
national wars. Generally speaking, countries with cred-
ibility to borrow can postpone the burden of war costs on
their citizens, and countries with lower credit costs are
more likely to win their interstate wars (Slantchev, 2012;
Shea, 2014, 2016; DiGiuseppe, 2015a, b). Countries
with poor reputations need to rely on taxation or infla-
tion (Bordo & White, 2009).
Research suggests that the very purpose of the first cen-
tral banks was to finance international wars (Broz, 1998;
Poast, 2015). Those central banks worked as commitment
devices toward domestic creditors, and enhanced the ability
to borrow from domestic banks at lower interest rates,
especially during wars (Broz & Grossman, 2004; Poast,
2015). Although the functions of central banks have
evolved, independent central banks have credibility-
enhancing effects on international credit markets (Max-
field, 1997; Bodea & Hicks, 2015b, 2018) that are
comparable to adherence to the Gold Standard in the past
(Bordo & Rockoff, 1996).
As I will explain later, the determinants and effects of
different types of conflict finance are likely different for
intrastate wars. Yet, government finance in civil wars is less
studied. Most research on civil war finance focuses on rebel
funding, and finds that access to economic resources –
whether it is natural resources in general (Lujala, 2010),
gems and narcotics (Fearon, 2004), remittances (Ballentine
& Sherman, 2003), or third-party support (Sawyer, Cun-
ningham & Reed, 2017) – make civil wars last longer.
Resources allowing longer fights do not necessarily forecast
rebel victories (Weinstein, 2005). Regarding the govern-
ment side, foreign funding, often categorized as ‘interven-
tions’, can also lengthen civil wars, in part because it can
encourage other funders to support the rebels (Regan,
2002), or because it increases uncertainty regarding the
other side’s relative strength (Narang, 2015). In contrast,
sanctions shorten civil wars and affect the mode of termi-
nation (Escribà-Folch, 2010). Overall, rebel-funding types
seem important for the outcomes of civil conflicts, but we
know less about how state funding – and more specifically,
monetary institutions – influence civil wars.
A theory of central bank independence
and civil war termination
Central banks are key institutions for a country’s econ-
omy. They affect the money supply in the economy,
1 Foreign aid can also help to fund war. However, it depends more on
the decision of donors than of the recipients.
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either directly, by printing currency, or in more indirect
ways, by setting the interest rate or financing fiscal
spending. Since their creation, central banks worked as
constraints on governments to guarantee the repayment
of their debts. Especially in the past decades, the powers
and functions of central banks evolved significantly. One
of the most important recent developments in central
banking is the increased levels of central bank indepen-
dence. Around the world, most governments insulated
central banks from political influence to pursue price
stability as their main goal. This development has
occurred in democracies and autocracies, in peace times,
and in countries experiencing civil wars (Garriga, 2016).
In spite of the diffusion of central bank independence,
there is significant variance in the levels and timing of
reforms.
Extensive research shows that central bank indepen-
dence has significant economic and political conse-
quences, ranging from inflation control or economic
growth (Cukierman, 1992; Alesina & Summers, 1993;
Bodea & Hicks, 2015a; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020) to
fiscal spending, regime survival, cabinet stability, and
even international wars’ dynamics (Broz, 1998; Clark,
Golder & Poast, 2013; Poast, 2015; Bodea & Higashi-
jima, 2017; Bodea, Garriga & Higashijima, 2019).
Recent work shows robust effects of central bank inde-
pendence on inflation both in democracies and autocra-
cies (Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020), and on credit markets
(Bodea & Hicks, 2015b, 2018). This suggests that cen-
tral bank independence has the potential to affect civil
war dynamics.
Central banks and civil war finance
Why should central banks and their independence
affect the dynamics of civil wars? When governments
face civil wars, they have incentives to use any tool at
their disposal to finance the war. The government’s
choice depends both on what sources of war finance
are available, and on who will suffer (more) the burden
of war – different forms of financing impose costs on
different domestic groups. The context of civil war may
add specific concerns regarding some forms of war
finance that are not as salient during interstate war. For
example, imposing the costs of war on the population
through inflation and taxes may not only reduce sup-
port for the war, but also push some citizens to oppose
the government (Grossman, 1991, 1995; Easterly &
Fischer, 2001; Kriner, Lechase & Cappella Zielinski,
2015). These approaches are therefore rather risky
during civil war.
Borrowing is another option, as it allows governments
to maintain the provision of goods to domestic groups
while spending on their war efforts. However, creditors
might be less likely to lend to civil war states compared to
states involved in interstate war. First, as in the case of
international wars, civil wars’ effects on the economy
may negatively affect the ability to repay the debt (Flan-
dreau & Flores, 2012; Slantchev, 2012). In civil wars,
however, there is an additional concern that if the rebels
win the civil war, they might repudiate the debt (Gross-
man & Han, 1996; Weidenmier, 2005).2 These risks
significantly affect not only the costs of borrowing, but
the mere access to credit (Grossman & Han, 1996;
Kirshner, 2007; Shea & Poast, 2017).
Monetary institutions can affect the options available
to states for financing war. Depending on their institu-
tional design, central banks can restrain or enable gov-
ernments to manipulate the economy, which has both
domestic and international economic consequences.
Restrictive monetary institutions – such as independent
central banks – may limit the influence of the govern-
ments on the design and application of monetary policy,
their access to the central bank lending, and in some
cases, even their fiscal spending (Neyapti, 2003; Bodea
& Higashijima, 2017).
I argue that the design of central banks can affect the
ability of governments to end civil wars. First, indepen-
dent central banks are a good signal in international
markets that can enhance the country’s credibility (Max-
field, 1997; Pastor Jr. & Maxfield, 1999; Bodea &
Hicks, 2018), allowing governments to borrow to fund
their war efforts, and likely improving the odds of gov-
ernments’ victories. Independent central banks can
increase the country’s credibility in two fronts: in terms
of likely debt repayment, and of commitment to infla-
tion control or economic orthodoxy (Bodea & Hicks,
2018; Garriga & Meseguer, 2019).
Other policies can work as credibility-enhancing
mechanisms. In particular, fixed exchange rates can per-
form as anti-inflationary commitment devices, but they
imply giving up the ability to use monetary policy (Rey,
2015). More importantly, fixed exchange rate regimes are
unlikely to affect the ability to repay debt in the future.3
Second, independent central banks are associated with
lower inflation. This effect is particularly important in
2 Recent examples of debt repudiation a year after a rebel victory are
Ghana 1982 and Rwanda 1995 (Armstrong, 2012).
3 Debt is normally denominated in major currencies. Even if debt
was denominated in local currency, countries can change the
exchange rate by an administrative act.
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countries experiencing civil wars, which tend to have higher
levels of inflation (Hamilton, 1977; Kang & Meernik,
2005). Inflation increases grievances (Grossman, 1991,
1995), and is linked to rebel support (Keen, 2005; Fielding
& Shortland, 2012).4 That is why inflation control can
reduce one additional source of grievances that civil wars
may impose on citizens, and strengthen the government.
Although most countries involved in civil wars have weak
political institutions, recent research shows that legal central
bank independence is effective in context of weak institu-
tions (Neyapti, 2001; Bodea, Garriga & Higashijima,
2019; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020). Furthermore, anecdo-
tal evidence shows that central banks are willing and able to
defend their legal prerogatives even in civil wars. For exam-
ple, the head of the less independent Libyan central bank
resisted pressures from both factions in the civil war,
refused to resign, maintained the headquarters in Tripoli,
and pleaded the bank’s neutrality to safeguard Libya’s
wealth (Kirkpatrick, 2015). In contrast, the dependent
Central Bank of Uganda was used by successive govern-
ments to finance the civil war (Brownbridge, 1998).
Restructured in 2000, the Bank was able to resist political
pressures and focus on financial stability and inflation con-
trol (Dafe, 2012).
Two caveats apply. First, this argument is not
necessarily intuitive: independent central banks may
also hamper the government’s war financing capabil-
ities. For example, by designing and applying mone-
tary policy insulated from political demands,
independent central banks should limit the govern-
ment’s ability to fund spending with inflation (Bodea
& Hicks, 2015a; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020), and
even curtail fiscal spending (Bodea & Higashijima,
2017; Bodea, Garriga & Higashijima, 2019). This
could reduce the government’s ability to direct
resources to the war, and thus extend the war and/
or reduce the likelihood of a government victory.
Although several mechanisms may be operating simul-
taneously, I argue that central bank independence
should be associated with better access credit markets
to finance the government’s war efforts, and with
lower inflation that reduces grievances that could incen-
tivize rebels to participate. This should compensate
restrictions on the government’s use of monetary policy
and of fiscal resources. In fact, these very restrictions
should enhance a country’s access to international credit
markets.
Second, a wide array of domestic and international
factors leads to civil war termination. This argument
does not suggest that the design of central banks is the
main driver of civil war termination, or that central
banks use their agency to terminate civil wars. However,
holding other things constant, central bank indepen-
dence allows governments fighting civil wars to finance
their war efforts, and to do it in ways that are less taxing
on their citizens, which facilitates shorter civil wars, and
government victories.
Overall, the possible relationship between central
bank independence and civil war outcomes is puzzling.
To disentangle these potential divergent effects, I test the
following hypothesis:
H1: (Higher) central bank independence increases
the likelihood of civil war termination.
If central bank independence improves the govern-
ment’s credibility, this should benefit governments not
only in terms of financing war efforts, but also in their
ability to negotiate with rebels: rebels, observing that the
government has access to funds to sustain the war, may
anticipate a likely government’s victory and may be more
likely to capitulate. However, I argue that central bank
independence should primarily affect the government’s
ability to obtain a military victory over the rebels for the
two main reasons mentioned earlier: first, increased cred-
ibility allows governments to access credit to finance
their warring efforts. Second, inflation control limits
(some) costs imposed on the citizens, reducing the neg-
ative consequences of inflation in terms of support for
the war, and potentially pushing citizens to oppose the
government.
H2: (Higher) central bank independence increases
the likelihood of government victory.
The following hypotheses test the proposed
mechanisms:
H3 (international credibility): Countries experiencing
civil wars with (more) independent central banks have
better access to international credit markets.
H4 (inflation): (More) independent central banks are
associated with lower inflation in countries experien-
cing civil wars.
4 Fielding & Shortland (2012) argue that inflation’s effect on wages
exacerbated the government’s recruitment and desertion problems in
Peru. Keen (2005: 82) links the NPRC’s inflation control to its
‘waging counterinsurgency “on the cheap”’, and inflation escalation
to ‘increased covert support for the rebels’ and young people turning
to the rebels (Keen, 2005: 77–79).
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Empirical analysis
Data and methods
The sample includes civil wars between 1975 and 2009
(145 government–rebel dyads), as identified in the
UCDP dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér,
2011). For Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is Con-
flict termination, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the
war ended in a given year, and zero otherwise (data from
Sawyer, Cunningham, & Reed, 2017). To test the effect
of central bank independence on different forms of ter-
mination (Hypothesis 2), I created a categorical variable
using Outcome from Kreutz (2010). The original data
includes six categories: government victory, rebel victory,
ceasefire, peace agreement, low activity, and actor disap-
pearance. Because the theory does not suggest differences
between some of these categories, I recoded the variable
to reflect Government Victory, Rebel Victory, Negotiated
termination (ceasefire and peace agreement), Other form
of termination (low activity and actor disappearance), and
Ongoing war.
The main independent variable is central bank inde-
pendence (CBI), taken from Garriga (2016). CBI is an
index that combines 16 legal attributes that affect central
bank independence following Cukierman’s (1992)
criteria.5 The index ranges from 0 (minimum) to 1 (max-
imum). I completed this source by recoding CBI ¼ 0 for
countries without a central bank. For the purposes of this
article, coding these observations as zeroes indicates that
monetary policy is in the hands of the government.
The baseline specification follows Sawyer, Cunning-
ham, & Reed (2017) and includes controls for the fac-
tions’ troop sizes, and a series of dummy variables
indicating the parity/superiority of the rebels (Buhaug,
2006), the existence of a legal political wing – data from
Sawyer, Cunningham, & Reed (2017) – and whether
the factions receive external support or not (Högbladh,
Pettersson & Themnér, 2011). Economic controls are
from the World Bank (2018), and include the country’s
population, GDP per capita, and oil-exports depen-
dence. Models include Democracy, a dummy variable
indicating whether the Polity score is 6 (Marshall &
Jaggers, 2012), and the proportion of the territory cov-
ered by forest (World Bank, 2018). Finally, I control for
the political proximity between the country and the USA
(Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten, 2017). Online appendix 2
shows descriptive statistics and the distribution of the
main variables.
To test Hypothesis 1, I estimate panel logistic regres-
sions, instrumental variable probit, and survival analyses.
To test Hypothesis 2, I estimate panel multinomial logis-
tic analyses. The inclusion of country- or dyad-fixed
effects substantially reduces the sample size and intro-
duces concerns regarding selection bias. Thus, I include
regional dummies in main models, but test the robust-
ness of results to other fixed effects.
Central bank independence in the civil war sample
The study of the effects of central bank independence on
a sample of countries experiencing civil war may raise
three concerns: First, central banks and reforms in coun-
tries experiencing civil wars may differ significantly from
those in other countries. Second, civil wars in countries
with independent central banks might be qualitatively
different from the ones experienced in countries with
dependent central banks. Third, governments with bet-
ter access to funding may be more willing to escalate
violence beyond the threshold to code a conflict as civil
war, and then win civil wars quickly.6
Regarding the first concern, descriptive data suggest
that central bank independence does not significantly
differ in countries experiencing civil wars. Figure 1 shows
levels and reforms to CBI in the world, and in countries
experiencing civil wars. The left-side panel in Figure 1
shows the yearly world average of CBI (0 minimum, 1
maximum independence), and the average for countries
experiencing civil wars. CBI has increased over time
around the world, and countries experiencing civil wars
have had, on average, slightly lower levels of central bank
independence than the world sample. However, this dif-
ference is not statistically significant.7
Furthermore, the rate of reforms affecting CBI in civil
war countries is not significantly different from the
worldwide sample’s rate:8 5.70% and 5.43% observa-
tions in the global and civil war samples experience
reforms, respectively. The right-side panel plots the per-
centage of countries experiencing reforms affecting CBI
per year – both for the world and for countries experien-
cing civil wars. I further disaggregate these reforms by
direction (CBI increases or decreases), in all countries
and in countries experiencing civil wars. Figure 2 shows
5 The index weighs variables coding the appointment and tenure of
the bank’s governor, the central bank’s objectives, its participation in
monetary policy, and limitations on lending to the government.
Online appendix 1 describes coding rules.
6 I thank a reviewer and the editor for raising this question.
7 The difference of means of the sample yearly average for countries
experiencing (or not) civil wars has Pr(|T|>|t|) ¼ 0.265.
8 Pr(|T|>|t|) ¼ 0.962.
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that reforms decreasing or increasing CBI are not more
prevalent in the civil war subsample.9
Finally, regarding the timing of reforms affecting CBI
and the civil conflict duration, although most observations
do not experience reforms, many countries in the sample
increased CBI during civil conflict (Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Israel, Nepal, Spain, Thailand, and
Turkey), and a few countries reduced CBI during a civil
conflict (notably, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and the
Figure 2. Number of reforms by direction (CBI increases and decreases) and year, in different samples (civil war and all
countries). Data from Garriga (2016) and UCDP (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011)
Figure 1. Central bank independence: Average level and reforms in the world, and in countries experiencing civil wars, per year.
Data from Garriga (2016) and UCDP (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011)
9 In Garriga’s (2016) data, the percentage of observations coded as
CBI increases between 1970 and 2012 is 4.27% (3.93% in the civil
war sample). 0.88% of the worldwide observations are coded as
decreases (0.80% in the civil war sample).
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UK). Figure A2.3 (Online appendix 2) plots the yearly level
of CBI and reforms per country included in the sample.
Regarding the second concern, descriptive data sug-
gest that civil wars in countries with independent central
banks are not significantly different from the ones in
countries with dependent central banks. Using data from
the first year of the conflict to minimize concerns regard-
ing the effect of my argued mechanism on the data,
neither the average number of fatalities, nor the goals
of the war (secessionism or control of the government)
differ significantly across subsamples of countries with
independent and dependent central banks.10
Finally, empirical analyses using Cunningham’s
(2016) data and model specification show that CBI is
not significantly associated with civil war onset (Online
appendix 3). Although these models have a different unit
of analysis (country-year instead of dyad-year), they sug-
gest that CBI does not affect the likelihood of countries
escalating conflicts beyond the threshold to be consid-
ered as civil wars.11
Central bank independence and civil war termination
Table I shows the test for Hypothesis 1. Model (1)
includes CBI and region effects. Models (2) and (3) show
the estimates of panel logistic regressions for the baseline
model without and with the CBI variable. In models (1)
and (3), CBI is positive and statistically significant, sug-
gesting that higher levels of central bank independence
are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict termi-
nation. The inclusion of CBI does not affect the direc-
tion and significance of the control variables: consistent
with previous studies, parity or rebel advantage is also
associated with a higher probability of war termination.
The size of the rebels’ troops, the presence of external
support for the rebels, and democracy are associated with
a lower likelihood of war termination.
Figure 3 (left-side panel) plots the predictive margins
at different levels of CBI after model (3). The plot
includes the sample distribution by CBI level. Holding
all continuous variables at their mean, and dummies at
their median, the probability of a war ending in a given
year is 0.115 without central bank (CBI¼ 0), and 0.151
if the central bank is very dependent (CBI ¼ 0.135, the
sample minimum). At the sample maximum (CBI ¼
0.9), the predictive margin is 0.481. The contrast of the
predictive margins is statistically significant at the 99%
level. Although drastic changes from minimum to max-
imum CBI have not occurred in the sample, these coeffi-
cients indicate that the probability of a war ending in a
given year more than triplicates if a country moves from
the lowest to the highest levels of CBI.
To address the concern that countries in a position to
end a civil war might be more likely to grant indepen-
dence to their central banks, I instrument CBI using the
lagged average level of CBI in the rest of the world
weighted by the inverse of the distance between capital
cities, the lagged level of democracy in the neighboring
countries, and the legal origin of the country (coded 1 if
the country follows the civil law tradition). The distance-
weighted world average of CBI is a satisfactory instru-
ment because there is evidence that one of the main
predictors of CBI is diffusion (Bodea & Hicks,
2015b); it is correlated with a country’s CBI, but it is
unlikely to affect a country’s likelihood to end an
ongoing civil war. Neighboring countries’ average
democracy and legal origin are also associated with CBI,
but they are not associated with the dependent vari-
able.12 The results of this analysis (model (4)) are con-
sistent with the main model. The right-side panel in
Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of the instrumented
CBI variable. In this estimation, the predicted probabil-
ity of a war termination is 0.07 when CBI is zero, and
0.32 when CBI equals 0.9 (holding dichotomous vari-
ables at their median and continuous variables at their
mean).
Finally, a Cox regression analysis also supports
Hypothesis 1 (see model (5)).13 Holding other factors
10 Using CBI0.5 in the first year to identify independent central
banks, the average number of deaths is 22.43 and 15 for countries
without and with independent central banks, respectively. The t-test
does reject that the difference in means is different from zero
(Pr(|T|>|t|) ¼ 0.2165). The percentage of secessionist civil wars in
each sample is 61% and 61.4% (Pr(|T|>|t|) ¼ 0.8291).
11 Given the structure of the data (the unit of analysis country-rebel
dyad, year), I cannot directly use a selection model for the main
models: A sample for a dyad-year selection model would need to
include the universe of dyads experiencing conflict plus all
potential dyads that could have escalated into civil wars but have
not escalated yet. This would require data on groups of dissidents
or rebels that have not used violence yet, or that have used violence
without reaching the threshold of victims. This is possibly why, as far
as I am aware, no study of civil war termination or severity that uses
dyad-year as unit of analysis includes a selection model.
12 The instruments are positive and significantly associated with CBI.
The Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are
exogenous (Prob>chi2 ¼ 0.59).
13 Because some governments are involved in more than one conflict
at the same time (several dyads), these models account for shared
frailty at the country level (Andersen et al., 1997). I thus interact
the continuous measure with the log of time as in Licht (2011).
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Table I. Estimates of conflict termination. Different estimation techniques
Model (1) (2) (3)
(4) (5)
Panel logit Panel logit Panel logit IV probit Cox regression(§)
Estimation First stage
CBI 2.600*** 2.681*** 1.570* 6.254* þ525%
(0.767) (0.763) (0.620) (5.231)
Troop size, govt (ln) 0.0167 0.0539 0.0663 –0.0100 0.967
(0.122) (0.125) (0.0614) (0.0116) (0.0970)
Troop size, rebel (ln) –0.248** –0.246** –0.158* –0.00767 0.800** –20%
(0.0862) (0.0882) (0.0638) (0.00589) (0.0573)
Legal political wing 0.454 0.596 0.184 –0.0564 1.777y þ78%
(0.453) (0.457) (0.247) (0.0447) (0.571)
Parity/rebel advantage 1.010y 1.398* 1.181*** –0.203* 3.609** þ261%
(0.604) (0.642) (0.281) (0.0878) (1.633)
External support, govt –0.211 –0.396 –0.265 0.0323 0.693
(0.284) (0.295) (0.161) (0.0481) (0.161)
External support, rebel –0.937*** –0.831** –0.383* –0.0599y 0.645* –35%
(0.262) (0.266) (0.172) (0.0340) (0.135)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.139 0.159 0.0863 –0.0695** 1.274
(0.179) (0.184) (0.109) (0.0269) (0.219)
Democracy –0.769y –1.107* –0.456 0.0895* 0.496* –50%
(0.418) (0.440) (0.317) (0.0404) (0.171)
Population (ln) –0.142 –0.132 –0.102 –0.00720 0.931
(0.163) (0.167) (0.0758) (0.0258) (0.139)
Oil –0.579 –0.735 0.147 0.0381 0.429y –57%
(0.521) (0.533) (0.335) (0.0736) (0.187)
Forest 0.0389 0.0606 0.0247 0.0189 0.883
(0.161) (0.162) (0.0961) (0.0247) (0.129)
Affinity with USA –1.103 –0.572 –0.126 –0.155 0.138* –86%
(1.041) (1.059) (0.561) (0.139) (0.124)
Instruments:










Constant –0.833 1.691 4.113 0.561 1.029*
(0.508) (3.228) (3.089) (2.109) (0.465)
Observations/subjects 708 708 708 673 673 708
Dyads 145 145 145 135 135 145
No. of failures 153
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
McKelvey&Zavoina’s R2 0.1428 0.1294 0.1749
Wald chi2/Chi2 19.48 39.19 47.46 83.78 131.97
Wald Test of Exogeneity (p value) 0.5941
Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, y p <0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(§)Cox regression. Breslow method for ties. Gamma shared frailty (cowcode). Coefficients and standard errors are exponentiated (seEform).
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constant, a conflict (government–rebel dyad) in a coun-
try with a fully independent central bank has a 525%
higher risk to end in a given year, compared to a conflict
in a country without a central bank. No country moved
from scoring 0 to 1 in the CBI index. However, a stan-
dard deviation increase in CBI (0.209) is associated with
a 46.7% increase in the risk of ending in a given year.14
The existence of a legal political wing, and parity or rebel
advantage also statistically significantly increase the risk
of war termination. Larger rebel troops, external support
for the rebels, democracy, the existence of democracy, oil
production, and affinity with the USA reduce the risk of
wars ending in a given year. Figure 4 shows the propor-
tional hazards ratios at different levels of CBI (the sample
maximum and minimum, and at the 0.5 cut-off point,
normally used to indicate an independent central bank).
Overall, these analyses provide support to the hypothesis
stating that central bank independence is associated with
a higher likelihood of war termination.
Robustness checks
The results reported in this article are robust to different
estimation techniques, different measure of the depen-
dent variable, and the inclusion of additional controls.
All tables are in Online appendix 4.
First, the literature on civil war termination normally
uses pooled logistic analysis with clustered errors. Results
hold using this technique (top left panel, Figure 5). I
obtain similar results if I dichotomize CBI, coded 1 if
CBI0.5, and zero otherwise (top center panel, Figure 5).
In these models, the probability of a war ending in a
given year is 0.20 if the central bank is not independent.
When the central bank is independent, the predictive
margin is 0.41.
To reduce concerns regarding the case of countries
that, in view that they are losing the war, might reduce
the independence of their central banks, I replace the
current levels of CBI for the level of CBI the year before
the conflict initiated. Results hold (top-right panel).
Figure 4. Hazards ratios at different levels of central bank
independence
Figure 3. Probability of End of Conflict at different levels of CBI. Different estimation techniques
14 The effect of a standard deviation is the coefficient exponentiated
[(6.254)^0.209 ¼ 1.467).
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The instrumental variable analysis addressed the con-
cern of potential endogeneity of central bank indepen-
dence to the ability to end a civil war. This may not
dissipate concerns regarding the independence of CBI
from state capacity. Although the literature and descrip-
tive data suggest that central bank independence may be
orthogonal to state capacity,15 it is possible that countries
with high state capacity are more likely to both delegate
monetary policy, and also end civil wars faster than
countries with low state capacity. I test the robustness
of these results to the inclusion of state capacity. I
decompose state capacity into two dimensions that can
be related to the ability of a government to end a civil
war: bureaucratic/administrative capacity, and military
capacity (Hendrix & Young, 2014). To proxy
Figure 5. Marginal effect of CBI on End of Conflict. Robustness checks
15 Research shows that CBI does not necessarily correlate with
institutional quality (Bodea, Garriga & Higashijima, 2019; Baerg,
Gray & Willisch, 2020; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020). Furthermore,
descriptive data suggest that CBI may be orthogonal to state capacity.
Many countries with high state capacity have independent central
banks. However, many countries with low state capacity delegate
monetary policy to technocrats because of their own inability to
conduct monetary policy, or because of international pressures for
reform (Maxfield, 1997; Polillo & Guillén, 2005; Bodea & Hicks,
2015a). Empirically, some countries scoring high in state capacity
proxies have or had low CBI (UK, Israel, or South Africa), and
others have high CBI. Conversely, some low-capacity states have
independent central banks (Nigeria), whereas others have dependent
central banks (Bangladesh).
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bureaucratic/administrative capacity, I include Tax
capacity, the log of the total tax share as a percentage
of GDP (Hendrix, 2010). To proxy military capacity, I
include military expenditure as a percentage of the
GDP, in logs (Military expenditure) – data from World
Bank (2018) – and Defense expenditure, the log of the
ratio of national defense expenditure to total national
expenditure (Banks & Wilson, 2016). Data missing-
ness significantly reduces the sample (models lose
between 12% and 46% of the observations). None of
the controls for state capacity achieves statistical signif-
icance in models excluding and including CBI. The
coefficient associated with CBI, and the predictive
margins, remain positive and statistically significant.
See marginal effects in Figure 5.
Results are robust to the inclusion of different mea-
sures of sanctions from Escribà-Folch (2010) (Table
A4.2), to the use of different fixed effects (I replace
region-fixed effects with dyad-fixed effects,16 and
decade-fixed effects with year-fixed effects), and to the
re-estimation of the baseline model using Cook, Hays
& Franzese’s (2020) penalized solution for fixed effects
in rare events data (Table A4.3). To address concerns
Table II. Estimates of form of termination. Multinomial logistic regression of civil war outcome
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Government victory Rebel victory Negotiated Other
CBI 6.286** 1.294 2.421** 0.696
(2.291) (3.216) (0.851) (0.740)
Troop size, govt (ln) –0.0291 2.502* 0.294 0.421*
(0.258) (1.189) (0.207) (0.172)
Troop size, rebel (ln) –1.329*** 0.329 0.151 –0.462***
(0.254) (0.352) (0.116) (0.100)
Legal political wing 2.153 0.796 0.465 0.221
(1.655) (1.178) (0.633) (0.485)
Parity/rebel advantage –14.06*** 8.222* 1.021 0.625
(1.910) (3.974) (0.924) (1.076)
External support, govt –2.815*** –3.625y –0.549y –0.379
(0.819) (2.063) (0.331) (0.319)
External support, rebel –2.292* 0.0600 –0.694* –0.700*
(1.148) (1.016) (0.336) (0.325)
GDP per capita (ln) –0.633 –2.336** –0.235 0.0161
(0.592) (0.867) (0.222) (0.209)
Democracy –3.292* –11.32*** 1.349** –0.195
(1.603) (1.369) (0.493) (0.491)
Population (ln) –0.422 –2.253** –0.649** –0.539**
(0.372) (0.864) (0.213) (0.187)
Oil 0.801 6.916* –0.179 0.640
(1.166) (2.800) (0.683) (0.530)
Forest 0.426 –0.175 0.378 0.0603
(0.430) (0.902) (0.240) (0.198)
Affinity with USA –0.335 3.032 0.843 –2.260y
(2.515) (6.676) (1.462) (1.315)
Duration –0.175* –0.156y –0.0154 –0.00415
(0.0828) (0.0940) (0.0196) (0.0174)
Constant 20.51* 12.44 6.553* 7.311*






Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, y p <0.1.
16 Models including country-fixed effects do not converge. When
forced to converge, results are similar to the main models.
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regarding eventual spuriousness of correlations among
trended time-series, or a post-Cold War shift that is
both affecting CBI and the duration of civil wars, I run
models including additional controls for trend, years
1989 and 1990, Cold War, and in subsamples before
and after the end of the Cold War, with and without
Trend (Table A4.4), and including Duration of the civil
war (Table A4.5).
Disaggregating the form of termination
Hypothesis 2 suggests that central bank independence
should be associated with a higher probability of a
government victory. Table II presents the estimates
of a panel multinomial logistic regression for Govern-
ment victory, Rebel victory, Negotiated termination
(including ceasefire and peace agreement), and Other
forms of termination (including low activity and actor
disappearance). The baseline outcome is ongoing war.
Figure 6 plots the predictive margins at different lev-
els of CBI.
Central bank independence is significantly associ-
ated with a higher likelihood of government victory.
Substantively, the average predicted probability of war
ending in a government victory in a given year is 0.007
in a country with a dependent central bank (CBI ¼
0.16), but it is 0.1 if the country has a very independent
central bank (CBI ¼ 0.9).17 These estimates are signif-
icant at 95% and provide support to Hypothesis 2. If
the continuous measure of CBI is replaced by the
dichotomous measure, results are similar: the probabil-
ity of a conflict ending in a government victory is 0.01
if the central bank is dependent, and 0.05 if it is inde-
pendent. Tables and plots in Online appendix 5.
Table II suggests that central bank independence is
also positively associated with the likelihood of observing
a negotiated agreement: the likelihood of this form of
termination is 0.075 on average, but 0.035 and 0.16 at
the maximum and minimum levels of CBI (CBI¼ 0 and
.9, respectively). This result suggests that central bank
independence may benefit governments not only in
terms of financing war efforts, but also in their ability
to negotiate with rebels. However, this result is not
robust to the use of the dichotomous measure for CBI.
Figure 6. Predictive margins for each form of termination, after multinomial logistic regression
17 The average predicted probability of observing a government
victory in a given year is 0.003.
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This is surprising because it suggests that drastic changes
in the government’s interference on monetary policy do
not affect the likelihood of negotiated outcomes, shed-
ding doubts on this association. Finally, CBI does not
significantly affect the probability of a rebel victory or of
other forms of termination.
In sum, CBI is robustly associated with a substan-
tial increase in the probability of a war ending in a
government victory. In some models, it is associated
with a larger predicted probability of negotiated ter-
mination, but this result is not robust. Finally, CBI
does not seem to affect the likelihood of other forms
of termination.
On the possible mechanism
I argue that central bank independence enhances the
ability of governments to end civil wars because it is a
good signal in international markets (Gray, 2013; Bodea
& Hicks, 2015a). In particular, I argue that central bank
independence signals the ability of the country to repay
debt, and the government’s commitment to economic
orthodoxy (Garriga & Meseguer, 2019) – that may also
affect the ability to repay. This should allow countries
that are experiencing civil wars but who have indepen-
dent central banks to have better access to international
credit. In this section, I test the plausibility of this
mechanism.
Hypothesis 3 states that central bank independence is
associated with better conditions in international credit
markets. I proxy access to credit markets using three vari-
ables: average interest rate (Interest rate), average grace
period in years (Grace period), and average maturity in years
(Debt maturity) of new external debt commitments.18
Table III. Access to international credit. New external debt commitments’ average interest, grace period and maturity
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Interest rate Interest rate Grace period Grace period Maturity Maturity
CBI –5.464*** –2.524*** 7.851*** 5.298*** 6.309* 8.089*
(0.538) (0.645) (0.867) (1.088) (2.811) (3.241)
Sample mean DV 0.742*** 0.638** 0.479**
(0.152) (0.199) (0.157)
Debt stock (mo. of –0.000560*** –0.000429 –0.00164*
Exports, ln) (0.000164) (0.000277) (0.000826)
GDP per capita (ln) –1.107** –1.708** –3.183y
(0.338) (0.571) (1.706)
Democracy –0.0504** 0.0592y 0.149
(0.0182) (0.0306) (0.0910)
Count of ongoing 0.384** –0.0444 –1.876**
conflicts (dyads) (0.124) (0.212) (0.627)
Conflict end –0.447*** –0.0409 1.389*
(0.132) (0.227) (0.669)
Conflict duration –0.0178y 0.0350* –0.0598
(maximum) (0.00966) (0.0163) (0.0485)
Conflict intensity –0.0844 –0.528y –1.828*
(maximum) (0.168) (0.284) (0.844)
Constant 6.138*** 10.46*** 2.191*** 13.19** 17.05*** 38.59**
(0.258) (2.486) (0.416) (4.025) (1.348) (12.49)
Observations 811 618 811 618 810 617
Countries 70 61 70 61 70 61
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Decade FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2: Within 0.122 0.316 0.0997 0.167 0.00677 0.0958
Between 0.0167 0.188 0.0669 0.244 0.0640 0.410
Overall 0.00738 0.0706 0.0554 0.144 0.0138 0.311
Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, y p <0.1.
18 Credit ratings also could proxy access to private lenders. However,
the three proxies for access to capital used here directly measure the
conditions of credit that are effectively available to countries from
either private sources or international financial institutions. The use
Garriga 13
Data are from the World Bank.19 I control for debt stock
(in months of exports, logged), log of GDP per capita,
regime type (using Polity2), sample average of the depen-
dent variable to account for the market conditions in a
given year,20 number of ongoing civil conflicts the govern-
ment is fighting in a given year, whether the conflict ended
in a given year, the maximum duration and the average or
maximum intensity of ongoing conflict(s). In these models,
the unit of analysis is country-year. I estimate regressions
with country and decade fixed effects on the sample of
countries experiencing civil wars.
Results in Table III and in Online appendix 6 show
support for this hypothesis. In countries with more inde-
pendent central banks than countries with dependent
banks, and where they are experiencing civil wars, new
debt commitments have lower interest rates, and longer
grace and maturity periods. Substantively, in models
including all controls and holding other variables con-
stant, a standard deviation increase in CBI (0.181) is
associated with a reduction of 0.5 percentage points in
interest rate (16% of the sample mean interest rate), and
with 1.06 and 1.38-year increases in the new debt com-
mitments’ grace period and loan maturity, respectively.21
Additionally, I posit that by controlling inflation,
more independent central banks could curb the negative
consequences of inflation that could potentially push
citizens to oppose the government (Grossman, 1991,
1995; Kriner, Lechase & Cappella Zielinski, 2015).
Hypothesis 4 tests the effect of CBI on inflation in coun-
tries experiencing civil wars. I measure inflation as the log
of the average monthly change in the consumer price
index (International Monetary Fund, 2018). Models
include Peg, a dichotomous variable indicating a fixed
exchange rate,22 Real GDP per capita, Trade openness
(exports plus imports, over GDP), Fiscal balance, and
World inflation. Data from the World Bank (2018). I
include Polity2 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2012) both as a
control and interacted with CBI (Bodea & Hicks,
2015a; Garriga & Rodriguez, 2020).
Results in Table IV show that CBI has a negative and
statistically significant coefficient in models without con-
trols, with Polity as control and as interactive term, and after
including conflict related controls. This suggests that even
in non-democratic countries experiencing civil war, central
Table IV. Effect of CBI on inflation in civil war countries
(1) (2) (3)






Inflation (ln)t-1 0.290* 0.290*
(0.113) (0.112)
GDP per capita (ln)t-1 0.440* 0.439
y
(0.214) (0.218)







Fiscal balancet-1 –0.0578*** –0.0579***
(0.0163) (0.0163)




Constant 3.983*** –1.175 –1.215
(0.581) (1.226) (1.265)
Observations 713 318 318
Countries 67 47 47
Country FE YES YES YES
Decade FE NO YES YES
R2: Within 0.090 0.373 0.374
Between 0.091 0.190 0.185
Overall 0.028 0.272 0.268
Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01,
* p <0.05, y p <0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
of credit ratings is further complicated for the lack of freely available
time series with sufficient coverage. However, there is research
showing that central bank independence is associated with better
risk ratings (Bodea & Hicks, 2018).
19 According to the World Bank’s definitions, maturity counts the
years to original maturity date (grace plus repayment periods). Grace
period counts years since the signature of the loan or issue of the
financial instrument to first repayment of principal. Repayment
period runs from the first to last repayment of principal. Data
average all public and publicly guaranteed loans, weighted by the
amounts of the loans (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
DT.MAT.OFFT? view¼chart accessed 1 March 2019).
20 This captures the effect of other factors not included in the model
that may affect worldwide credit availability, and thus, the interest
rate, grace and maturity periods of new debt commitments.
21 The civil war-sample mean for debt interest, grace period, and deb
maturity are 3.205%, 5.44 and 18.72 years, respectively.
22 Peg equals 1 when there is no separate legal tender, when there is a
pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, when there is a
pre-announced horizontal bandþ/–2%, or when there is a de facto
peg. Data from Reinhart & Rogoff (2009).
14 journal of PEACE RESEARCH XX(X)
bank independence is associated with lower inflation. This
effect is larger in more democratic countries (see Figure 7).
Inflation is normally not included in models of civil
war onset or intensity. I further test whether inflation is
associated with a lower probability of civil war onset. I
follow Cunningham (2016) and test the effect of two
measures of inflation (the natural log and inflation crises)
on civil war onset measured in two different ways: onset
of internal armed conflicts, and 1,000-battle-death civil
wars (Online appendix 7). These results show a positive
and generally significant relationship between inflation
and civil war onset.23
Conclusions
This article explores an understudied area of conflict
finance: the effects of monetary institutions on civil war
dynamics. I find that independent central banks are asso-
ciated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war
termination. This result is robust to different estimation
techniques, to the inclusion of different controls, and to
changes in the measurement of central bank indepen-
dence. When I disaggregate the form of termination,
central bank independence is associated with a higher
probability of government victory relative to continued
conflict and to other civil war outcomes. Central bank
independence does not significantly affect the likelihood
of other forms of war termination.24
The evidence supports the idea that central bank inde-
pendence enhances the ability of governments to end
civil wars because it is a good signal in international
markets, and because it curbs inflation. In countries
experiencing civil wars, governments with more inde-
pendent central banks contract new debt in better con-
ditions: they receive loans at lower interest rates, and
longer grace and maturity periods than countries with
dependent central banks. Furthermore, central bank
independence has inflation curbing effects in civil war
countries, which provides additional support for the pro-
posed mechanisms.
Support for my main hypotheses does not mean that a
tying-hands mechanism – that is, independent central
banks limit the ability of the government to use inflation
or fiscal resources to finance civil war efforts – is not at
work. However, even if present, hands-tying does not
seem to outweigh the other two mechanisms. In fact, I
argue that the better access conditions to international
credit markets and the reduced incentives to join rebel
forces when there is less inflation are largely due to these
constraints that independent central banks place on gov-
ernments. However, one important contribution of this
article is showing that potential negative effects of fiscal
constraints on the ability to fight and win civil wars can be
outweighed with access to credit and with the positive
effects of lower inflation on grievances.
These findings complement research on rebel funding.
Future research could investigate likely relations between
rebel and government funding in an integrated frame-
work. Additionally, they contribute to a recent literature
suggesting that, during conflicts, international capital may
free governments from their domestic economic con-
straints, allowing them to fight rebel opposition while
delivering services to the population (DiGiuseppe, Barry
& Frank, 2012; Shea, 2014; Poast, 2015; Cappella Zie-
linski, 2016; DiGiuseppe & Shea, 2016). This article,
however, focuses on what policies or domestic institutions
governments can enact in order to improve their access to
international markets. Future research should look at how
other ways states fund civil wars affect wars’ dynamics and
outcomes. Overall, monetary institutions seem to have
important effects on civil war termination, and govern-
ment victory in particular. This suggests that scholars and
policymakers alike should expand the framework for
analysis of civil war finance. Similarly, this opens further
questions on the non-economic consequences of mone-
tary institutions.
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